Gillian Mays

Gillian Mays

Gillian attained an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in English Literature from Queen’s University in 2011, receiving the Roscoe R. Miller Award and the Arts 1915 Price for academic excellence. She received her Juris Doctor from Western University in 2014 and was placed on the Dean’s Honour List.

Prior to joining Bogoroch & Associates LLP, Gillian articled at a full-service firm in London, and was called to the Bar in 2015. She has been published in The Advocates’ Journal and participated in the Gale Cup Moot, and is a member of the Canadian Bar Association, The Advocates’ Society, and the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association.

Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board), 2017 ONCA 962 (CanLII)

The Court of Appeal held that the tort of battery against police officers was not discoverable until the plaintiff was acquitted of criminal charges of assault of the officers and resisting arrest, thereby extending the “appropriate means” aspect of discoverability until the date of his acquittal.

Lazar v. TD General Insurance Company, 2017 ONSC 1242 (CanLII)

Aviva Insurance Company of Canada v. McKeown, 2017 ONCA 563

The Court of Appeal held that Section 33(4)3 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule does not require an insurer to give a specific reason for requesting an Examination under Oath of the claimant.

Dale v. Frank et al, 2017 ONCA 32

Wilk v Arbour, 2017 ONCA 21

The Court of Appeal held that the term “owner” in the Dog Owners’ Liability Act is more expansive than the colloquial meaning and refers to a person who has some measure of control and physical possession of the dog immediately prior to the injury. The Court furthered clarified the application of negligence to cases of injury by animals, holding that there must be “special circumstances” in which the owner could reasonably foresee that a specific animal was dangerous in specific circumstances.

Wright v. Detour Gold Corp., 2016 ONSC 6807

Where an expert has retained separate legal counsel to assist with the preparation of a report or affidavit, the expert will not be required to produce drafts or copies of communications between the expert and his or her counsel. However, the expert will be required to produce drafts and correspondence if there is a factual basis for the reasonable suspicion that counsel has improperly influenced the expert.